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Lessons learnt and unlearnt. Hungary’s 15 years in NATO 
 
Hungarian security and defence policy has experienced a fundamental trans-
formation in the past two decades leading towards and following the country’s 
accession to NATO in 1999. This transformation has meant more than a shift, 
much more a fundamental change right from its founding values and core aims. 
During the 1990s, leading to Hungary’s NATO membership, the country - its po-
litical and economic systems, as well as its society - strived to leave behind the leg-
acy of the Soviet Eastern Block and the Warsaw Pact. Three parallel processes 
have been underway in this regard: Hungarian security and threat perception, the 
scope and characteristics of the international role Hungary desires to play, and the 
corresponding institutional framework have been transformed. Thus, 15 years of 
NATO membership has had an all-encompassing effect on Hungary’s security, 
including the country’s defence policy and its institutions, the country’s involve-
ment in international crisis management efforts, the development of national de-
fence capabilities and Hungarian society’s relation to the armed forces. In spite of 
this, the relevant literature in English on the country’s lessons learnt in these fields 
is rather limited, not to mention the practical lack of analyses on “lessons un-
learnt”, some deficiencies that might serve as guidelines for prospective members 
of NATO on what to do differently. The aim of this brief study is to draw the 
most significant conclusions of Hungary’s 15 years within NATO from a critical 
but understanding point of view. 
In this chapter, first an overview of the evolution of Hungarian strategic cul-
ture sets the wider scene for mapping up transformative processes leading to the 
birth and naturalization of a truly “transatlantic” Hungarian defence policy. Then 
the conclusions of Hungary’s NATO membership are drawn and the most  
important lessons learnt, as well as obstacles and prevailing deficiencies as “lessons 
unlearnt” are pointed out at the strategic level. 
 
Changes in Hungarian strategic culture brought about by Euro-Atlantic integration 
 
Throughout and after the 1989 transition period, military and strategic  
thinkers were primarily preoccupied with the dilemma of how to define sovereign 
foreign and defence policy1 and how to provide a sustainable financial and organi-
 
 
1 J. L. Kiss, European Security: Hungarian Interpretations, Perception and Foreign Policy, [in:] O. Wæver,  
O. Lemaitre, E. Tromer (eds.), European Polyphony. Perspectives Beyond East - West Confrontation,  
Macmillan: London 1989, pp. 141-154; P. Dunay, Adversaries all around?: (Re)Nationalization of Security 
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zational background for the Hungarian Armed Forces.2 Later on the evolving  
strategic trends (the growing number of international peace support, crisis man-
agement and stabilizing operations) and NATO (and to a lesser extent EU) en-
largement in Eastern Central Europe moved strategic thinking towards new fea-
tures of strategic culture necessary for participation in such frameworks: multina-
tional cooperation, interoperability and joint missions.3 The non-military toolbox 
and geographical focus of international action have accordingly been broadened.4 
The gradual move to the path of Euro-Atlantic integration has significantly 
transformed the Hungarian understanding of security. The perception of security 
in Hungary took on a multi-dimensional feature quite early, already from the be-
ginning of the 1980s, opening up economic, societal, political and environmental 
aspects besides the contemporarily predominant military aspect. This approach has 
been further strengthened since the transition period, and non-military aspects 
have been defined both by Hungarian society and political elites as being determi-
nant. Even though the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Balkan Wars were inter-
preted in the military security domain in the 1990s, as well as the fact that  
accession to NATO was a predominantly military issue and was understood in the 
wider context of national and international peace, stability and security in the  
second place only, empirical research has revealed that the security perception of 
Hungarian society is primarily non-military: it is focused on internal, existential 
issues, such as employment, social welfare and public safety.5 
As Hungarian security and threat perception identifies predominantly internal, 
existential and social issues as matters of concern, all of them being non-military 
issues, not only the country’s international ambitions are tailored to this tight 
scope of national concern and popular support, but also the means and resources 
available for foreign and security policy action (as well as homeland defence and 
 
and Defence Policies in Central and Eastern Europe, Netherlands Institute of International Relations: 
Hague 1994; H. Vincze (ed.), Hungary’s Security in the New Regional and International Context, “Defence 
Studies”, No. 42., Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies: Budapest 2000. 
2 P. Tálas, Biztonságpolitikai kihívások és haderőreform az ezredfordulón. “Magyar Tudomány”, 2000/7,  
pp. 933-937; J. Szabó, Haderőváltás Magyarországon 1989-2001, A rendszerváltás konfliktusa, kezelésük 
története és perspektívái a védelmi szektorban, PolgART: Budapest 2003. 
3 P. Tálas, Az európai integrációs szervezetekhez való magyar csatlakozás előnyei - a távolmaradás kockázatai. 
[in:] Társadalompolitikai kérdések. Magyar Honvédség Tájékoztatási és Médiaközpont: Budapest 1998, 
pp. 43-71; Z. Szenes, 10 éves NATO - tagság és a haderő átalakítása, “Honvédségi Szemle” 2009/2, pp. 
6-9. 
4 Z. Szenes, A békefenntartás hatása a magyar haderőre. “Hadtudomány”, 2006/3, pp. 3-14; Z. Szenes, 
Conceptual change in Hungarian peacekeeping? “Nemzet és Biztonság” Special Issue, Winter 2009,  
pp. 43-55. 
5 L. Radványi, A magyar lakosság biztonságfelfogása és értékpreferenciái, 1999-2008, “Nemzet és Biz-
tonság”, 2009/2. pp. 9-22; P. Tálas, Tatárszentgyörgy után… Széljegyzet a biztonság szubjektív 
percepciójának veszélyeiről, “Nemzet és Biztonság”, 2009/2, pp. 3-8. 
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the armed forces) are very limited. This limitation - further exacerbated by  
repeated economic crises6 - has regularly been echoed by international partners as 
Hungary performing as a security consumer, thus not contributing proportionately 
to the ratio of the benefits enjoyed. 
The Hungarian professional political sphere shows similar tendencies to those 
of public perceptions: depicting security and defence policy as being of lesser  
importance and initiating very limited public debate have been common features 
of the political and societal discourse. Strategic debate on foreign and security  
policy issues beyond current problems is rarely held in the Hungarian Parliament, 
despite the fact that subsequent governments and parliaments have adopted stra-
tegic documents on foreign and security policy (the last time being in 2012). The 
drafting and adoption of these strategies have rarely been preceded or followed by 
professional and political debate invoking a wide-based national consensus, but 
have been limited to the participation of a small number of advisors and members 
of the central administration. Thus, Hungarian foreign and security policy has  
developed a dichotomy, over which a vaguely defined national consensus has also 
been reached. On the one hand military aspects of security were pushed back on 
the agenda (signalled by shrinking military expenditures, the prolonged reform of 
the armed forces and the strong limitations on participation in crisis management 
operations). On the other hand, a constant endeavour has been developed to meet 
the expectations of burden-sharing from Allied and great powers that might im-
prove the negative balance brought about by fading military capabilities, and might 
buffer international criticism towards Hungary. 
At the same time, some mutually reinforcing historical features have also pre-
vailed: the inability to significantly transform the broader security environment 
(something which can be called a ‘small state syndrome’), an adaptive and pacifist 
foreign policy orientation, strong limitations on the use of military force and  
a general risk-limiting behaviour on the international scene. National interests 
therefore are always articulated with regard to the spheres of influence the country 
can maintain: regarding neighbouring countries (where also Hungarian ethnic mi-
norities reside) and the wider Central European region and the neighbouring Bal-
kans, and to some extent, Eastern Europe. However, experience has shown in 
previous years that even in these geographically proximate regions exerting  
influence through political, diplomatic and economic soft power tools has strong 
 
 
6 Hungarian society has faced repeated economic crises that have gravely effected its security per-
ception: in 1989/90 it was the direct economic consequence of the change of regime, followed by 
another crisis in 1994/95 due to the mismanagement of the economic transformation; 2006 already 
brought another economic crisis as the Hungarian economy underperformed and this was further 
exacerbated by the 2008 European financial and then economic crisis. Lately, 2012 meant another 
backslide, with somewhat more promising performance since 2013. 
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limitations and national interests are best channelled through international institu-
tions. 
Membership in international institutions also means that Hungary shares their 
burdens and contributes to the pursuit of their agenda, as in the case of NATO. 
Unilateral action regarding international security policy is strictly out of reach for 
the country, both in terms of willingness and capabilities. Peace support/crisis 
management/humanitarian operations are only possible as a member of a larger 
coalition, whether be it institutionalized (NATO, EU, OSCE, UN) or ad hoc (as in 
the case of the 2003 Iraq war), usually in support roles only. These strong limita-
tions on the use of military force can be attributed to a risk-limiting behaviour that 
seeks to avoid casualties.7 
The participation in crisis management operations carried out in the wider se-
curity environment of the Euro-Atlantic region is justified and is always carefully 
judged on a case-by-case basis with regard to national interests and capabilities. 
Accordingly, as one quantifiable measure of international ambitions, in 2007 Hun-
gary set its level of ambition for all types of simultaneous international missions 
within any organization at a maximum of 1000 troops (including observers, advi-
sors, etc.).8 This level was maintained until recently: before the drawdown of ISAF 
forces began in 2013, about two thirds of Hungarian troops had been deployed in 
NATO missions, less than 20% in EU and less than 10% in UN missions. 
In sum, as argued by Csiki and Tálas, based on the assessment of the trans-
formative processes of the 1990s in Hungary that moved the country towards full 
Euro-Atlantic integration and developed a definite transatlantic bond, we cannot 
definitely state that a well-defined, coherent Hungarian strategic culture has 
evolved. “Instead, contemporary strategic culture in Hungary has remained in  
a state of transformation, stuck between outdated structural-institutional remains 
of the (post) Cold War era and the pressing need [for] modernization within a mul-
tinational Euro-Atlantic security framework.”9 
 
The direct effects of Hungary’s accession to NATO and the lessons learnt 
 
Hungarian security and foreign policy has followed a relatively consistent Eu-
ro-Atlantic path since soon after the period of regime change. Not only internal 
political and institutional transitions, but the favourable transformation of the  
 
 
7 F. Molnár, Napjaink domináns katonai konfliktusa és az adaptív haderő, “Nemzet és Biztonság”, 
2011/1, pp. 48-57. 
8 Appendix to the 85/2007 MoD Directive for long-term defense planning, 2009 - 2018. 
9 T. Csiki, P. Tálas, Can we identify a coherent strategic culture in Hungary?, [in:] H. Biehl, B. Giegerich,  
A. Jonas (eds.) Strategic Cultures in Europe. Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent. Springer: 
Wiesbaden 2013, pp. 165-180. 
 
- 63 - 
international security environment and the open approach of Euro-Atlantic organ-
izations have significantly contributed to this process. As a result, the country’s 
foreign and security policy can be described as oriented towards the Euro-Atlantic 
community, within the wider value-based framework of international institutions 
(Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, United 
Nations Organization). 
However, it is important to note that Hungary has experienced two decades 
of continuous transformation and it was due to these simultaneous and parallel 
favourable processes that the country gradually moved towards Euro-Atlantic in-
tegration. NATO’s Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation (1991) and the 
launch of the Partnership for Peace (1994) made for significant positive drivers in 
this process and opened up the way for Euro-Atlantic integration - and along with 
the Balkan Wars resulting from the dissolution of Yugoslavia this external transi-
tion was the key strategic issue addressed in Hungary throughout the decade. The 
adoption of new defence policy guidelines in 1998 reflected this shift in priorities, 
clearly targeting accession to NATO and the European Union after fulfilling the 
respective political, economic and military accession criteria. Meanwhile, internal 
transition continued and the democratic control of the armed forces was complet-
ed, whilst facing the double challenge of continuously cutting down on defence 
expenditures both in terms of resources and manpower, and the urgent need to 
adopt the new institutional culture of NATO for the military in terms of interop-
erability. 
The role the North Atlantic Alliance played in Hungary’s foreign and security 
policy agenda then became fundamental and has remained so since then. The 
threatening military conflict in the Balkans and the crisis management role NATO 
decided to take on drove Hungary faster and closer to the Alliance than many 
would have expected even in 1994. The first major foreign deployment of Hungar-
ian armed forces (military engineers) took place within the framework of the Im-
plementation Force (IFOR) in 1996 also providing host nation support for NATO 
forces in Hungary, and continued within the Stabilization Force (SFOR) from 
1997 (later under EUFOR Althea since 2004). These engagements already pawed 
the way for the interoperable development of the national armed forces. Following 
Hungary’s NATO-accession, further engagement followed in the Alliance’s Koso-
vo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF) operations showing allied solidarity and 
commitment to international peace.10 
 
 
10 For an overview of Hungary’s contribution to NATO in the period 2010 - 2014 see: C. Törő,  
P. Wagner, NATO feladataink, vállalásaink és eredményeink a magyar külpolitika szemszögéből az elmúlt négy 
évben, Manuscript, Budapest 2014. 
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Interestingly, the first fully developed National Military Strategy was only first 
adopted in 2009, showing the secondary role military strategy had played for the 
political elite on the one hand, and a somewhat belated adoption of the practice of 
drafting long-term strategic documents for the Hungarian Defence Forces on the 
other. Even in 2012 when the effects of the financial crisis forced the adoption of 
both a new National Security Strategy and a National Military Strategy, these doc-
uments showed to some extent the lack of executable long-term planning, provid-
ing mostly a “global vision”11 and not a functional implementation as the required 
resources and modernization schedule had not been identified.12 As repeatedly 
mentioned, the Hungarian military has continuously been underfinanced since the 
change of regime and after an initial increase around NATO-accession it has  
mostly shown a decreasing trend in the past 10 years. 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Hungarian GDP 
(billion HUF) 
20665.0 22018.3 23675.0 24989.9 25643.3 
Defence budget 
(billion HUF) 
346.9 288.1 283.1 278.2 319.7 
Defence budget as 
share of GDP (%) 
1.68 1.31 1.20 1.11 1.25 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Hungarian GDP 
(billion HUF) 
25626.5 26.513.0 27635.4 28048.0 29144* 
Defence budget 
(billion HUF) 
320.6 308.2 248.9 234.8 241.4 
Defence budget as 
share of GDP (%) 
1.25 1.16 0.90 0.83 0.83 
Table: The Hungarian defence budget, 2004-201313 
(* - Estimated) 
 
Despite some obvious shortcomings, NATO has clearly been identified in 
these strategic documents as the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security, stability 
 
 
11 T. Csiki, P. Tálas, Az új Nemzeti Katonai Stratégia a nemzetközi tapasztalatok tükrében, “Nemzet és 
Biztonság”, 2014/2, pp. 45-61. 
12 T. Csiki, P. Tálas, Stratégiától stratégiáig. A 2009-es és a 2012-es magyar katonai stratégia összehasonlító 
elemzése, “Nemzet és Biztonság”, 2014/2, pp. 36-76. 
13 Source: Respective annual Budget Acts’ provision for defense (without implemented sequestrations), Central 
Statistics Agency statistics for Gross National Product. 
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and prosperity whose international agenda means primary commitments for  
Hungary. Still, we can see two opposing trends: on the one hand the ‘strategic  
vocabulary’ of the transatlantic community has been successfully adopted and  
Hungarian defence policy has been deeply embedded in NATO’s security agenda, 
while on the other hand, serious deficiencies have prevailed regarding funding and 
modernization (see the next subchapter as a determining lesson unlearnt). 
As for the military tools of foreign and security policy and possible military 
action, decision making was brought under strict civilian control during the 1990s 
in accordance with the democratic requirements also formulated by NATO.14 
Command structures evolved further by 1996 when the Joint Forces Command of 
the Hungarian Defence Forces was created in order to meet NATO requirements, 
and in 2001 when the Joint Forces Command was integrated into the Ministry  
of Defence, achieving a fully transparent civilian command and control structure 
in this field. 
The strict authorization rule concerning the foreign deployment of the armed 
forces also became somewhat looser as a consequence of the decision to create the 
NATO Response Forces at the 2002 Prague Summit, because a potential deploy-
ment required rapid decision making schemes. Previously, 21 days of foreign  
deployment for a maximum of 100 troops could be authorized by the Ministry of 
Defence, while after the December 2003 modification of the Constitution and the 
Homeland Defence Act, any international engagement invoked upon the consen-
sus of NATO member states became possible based on a government decision 
while also informing the parliament. 
The direct effects of NATO membership can be identified in three areas: in 
the transformed Hungarian security and defence policy that can be traced in stra-
tegic documents; in terms of compatibility with NATO institutional structures and 
systems, and interoperability with other NATO members’ armed forces; and the 
contribution of the Hungarian Defence Forces to the Alliance’s collective defence 
tasks and crisis management operations. Lessons learnt in these respects include 
learning the institutional culture of NATO and participating fully in decision  
making, also ensuring the democratic control of the defence sector as well as effec-
tively contributing to Allied defence and operations through NATO structures.15 
 
 
14 F. Molnár, Civil - Military Relations in Hungary: From Competition to Co-operation, [in:] H. Born,  
M. Caparini, K. Haltiner, J. Kuhlmann (eds.) Civil - Military Relations in Europe: Learning From Crisis 
and Institutional Change, Routledge: New York 2007, pp. 114-129. 
15 For an insight of what results are identified by current political and military leaders, defense 
policy experts and diplomats with regard to Hungary’s NATO membership, see the interview series 
“15 Years - 15 Voices. Lessons Learnt from Hungary’s 15 Years within NATO” compiled throughout 
2014. 15 Év - 15 Hang. Magyarország 15 éves NATO-tagságának tapasztalatai, [www.nit.uni-nke.hu, 
access: 7 September 2014]. 
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Lessons unlearnt 
 
Regarding lessons unlearnt, there are three broad topics in which Hungary 
needs to learn from the experiences of the past 15 years: the underdeveloped secu-
rity culture of Hungarian society and the political elite; unfinished and fragmented 
attempts at “reform and modernization”; and a lack of understanding of the true 
potential of deep and intense multinational defence cooperation. 
The broadest set of problems is that both Hungarian society and the political 
elite have an underdeveloped security culture that is based on their primarily non-
military security perception briefly discussed earlier. This in practice means that 
issues beyond economic and societal security rarely become subjects of interest or 
concern for Hungarian people. Unfortunately, subsequent governments have also 
followed a very limited, self-constrained information policy, providing only super-
ficial information on Hungarian security and defence policy or the Hungarian  
Defence Forces.16 Critically speaking, one might also raise questions about trans-
parency and accountability issues taking into account the fact that no detailed in-
formation is dispersed in public about the specificities of the budgetary resources 
used for defence. The negative effects of this restrained stand have been rein-
forced by the vanishing representation of foreign and security policy issues both in 
public and commercial media - TV, radio and internet news portals - in recent 
years, leading to a general disinterest and indifference across wide strata of  
Hungarian society. Thus, besides being uninterested, people have to a significant 
extent become uninformed about defence issues, as well as institutions such as 
NATO. 
Thus, 15 years after NATO-accession we can conclude that the Hungarian 
people in general have very limited contact to defence issues and this trend has 
been reinforced by the suspension of conscription in 2004, effectively abolishing 
this direct, practical tie between society and the Hungarian Armed Forces. Since 
then, the Hungarian Defence Forces has remained visible in everyday life only 
through their crisis management role in natural disaster relief (floods) and through 
HDF bomb squads tasked with ordnance disposal which is still a frequent issue 
due to the large number of ammunitions left behind from World War II.  
 
 
16 If we want to contrast this policy approach, we can easily point out German and British examples 
where both the Bundeswehr and the British Armed Forces provide detailed and up-to-date, easily 
accessible online information on their international engagement, missions and presence, including 
force levels and mission tasks, while the Hungarian Ministry of Defense rarely provides such in-
formation directly, while the HDF mostly distributes promotional material via online and social 
media. For MoD-related information see: “Honvédelmi Minisztérium” [www.kormany.hu, access: 1 
September 2014], for information released for the wider public see: “Honvedelem.hu” 
[www.honvedelem.hu, access: 1 September 2014] and related social media sites. 
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Meanwhile, civic (NGO), governmental (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) and media activities that could improve the situation have also largely been 
lacking or have remained ineffective. Public engagement is very weak and only  
a surprisingly low number of actors carry out activities - such as information cam-
paigns, public outreach programmes - with limited visibility and practical effect. 
This is particularly true for NATO.17 
These, coupled with the perception on the part of the population that peace 
and security can be taken for granted without further effort, have resulted in a lack 
of ownership and a lack of feeling of responsibility on the part of the population 
for their own defence. Similar problems have recently been studied by NATO 
through think tanks in a number of member states with the aim of finding out 
how much defence in fact ‘matters’.18 Even though Hungary was not included in 
the project, and no thorough studies have been carried out in this respect, similari-
ties can be observed in this respect highlighting a general, abstract support for the 
armed forces and defence, but coupled with a disinterest in particular single issues. 
The following conclusions identified in eight member states by the Defence  
Matters Project also count for Hungary: “Defence spending has some general sup-
port, but other (social) issues are seen as more pressing. But there is also a lack of 
interest in the specifics and details of defense among the wider public.” “There is a 
lack of strategic debate (…) The strategic community is often detached from the 
general public.”19 
The lesson identified and so far unlearnt in this regard in Hungary is that there 
is an ongoing need to continually keep society engaged and informed. Besides, it is 
also advisable to keep members of the political elite aware of their role and duty to 
address defence issues effectively and manage them responsibly.20 In order  
 
 
17 In principle, NGOs with a strong focus on the Euro-Atlantic policy agenda do function in 
NATO member and partner countries, such as national chapters of the Atlantic Treaty Association 
(ATA) or its youth organization (YATA). In contrast, very few organizations are active in this field 
in Hungary: the Hungarian Atlantic Council and its youth organization are hardly functioning and 
currently no other NGO has tried to fill this ‘gap’ in the NGO sector. With regard to think tanks, 
only two institutions can be found to be active in the foreign, security and defence policy field: the 
Hungarian Institute of International Affairs and the MoD-affiliated think tank, the Centre for  
Strategic and Defence Studies. 
18 See the Defense Matters project’s concluding conference and related reports at Carnegie Europe,  
26 November, 2013, [www.carnegieeurope.eu, access: 1 September 2014]. 
19 Defense Matters - Discussion Paper, p. 3. “Carnegie Europe” [www.carnegieendowment.org, access:  
1 September 2014.] 
20 Unlike in Poland, for example, members of the Hungarian Parliament - even of the Committee 
on Defence and Law Enforcement - in Hungary receive no formal in-advance education, training 
or briefing on national and international security and defence policy or foreign policy issues before 
they take their offices. This might be problematic in various respects when informed decision mak-
ing and well-established professional debates would be necessary regarding the budget, moderniza-
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to achieve this, the developing of permanent contacts and regular meetings of  
relevant parties - members of the political and military elite, think tanks, media 
representatives and various groups within society, especially the young - would be 
necessary, triggering their active participation and deepening their involvement. 
The second set of lessons unlearnt can be seen with regard to the ‘reform and 
transformation’ of the armed forces. As mentioned before, the most fundamental 
challenges to the Hungarian Defence Forces have been their being underfinanced 
and being in a constant process of being in unfinished and incomplete waves of 
reform, transformation or attempts at modernization. 
The fluid conditions and unaccomplished targets resulted in various problems 
already before NATO accession but there have been even more since 1999. The 
Hungarian Ministry of Defence had to carry out two strategic and defence reviews 
within a couple of years (1999 and 2003) in an attempt to align policy and planning 
mechanisms and have them fully interoperable with NATO standards and pro-
cesses. Recommendations drafted in 1999, first and foremost about streamlining 
Hungarian command and control processes with those of NATO, were achieved 
by 2001. As a next step, the recommendations drafted in 2003 on a NATO-
compatible defence planning system were fulfilled in the following years, and even-
tually a new system for the evaluation and assessment of the external and internal 
security environment and resulting military tasks was been developed and intro-
duced based on the strategic foresight analysis methodology applied by NATO.21 
However, most conclusions of these strategic reviews regarding military capa-
bilities (or their shortcomings) and the repeated calls for technological moderniza-
tion have been neglected and no other strategic review has been carried out since 
2003 despite the adoption of new National Military Strategies in 2009 and 2012. 
The negative consequences of this ‘modernization gap’ have been summarized by 
the current Minister of Defence, Csaba Hende in June 2013 as follows: “The Hun-
garian Defense Forces have not procured any major equipment since the change 
of regime period with the sole exception of the Gripen program.22 The equipment 
that is still in service [was] mostly [sic] manufactured in the Warsaw Pact era, 30 - 
40 years ago. Within 10-years time all of these will have to be scrapped and we 
 
tion or deployment of the Hungarian Defence Forces. Instead, discussion and debates - if they take 
place at all - mainly follow the dynamics of party politics even in defence issues. 
21 B. Németh, A PESTEM és PMESII stratégiai elemző rendszerek összehasonlítása: A Honvédelmi  
Minisztérium új stratégiai értékelő rendszere, “Felderítő Szemle”, March 2014, pp. 126-141. 
22 Based on repeatedly altered negotiation targets and contractual commitments, Hungary has been 
leasing 14 JAS-39A/B Gripen planes, in service since 2008. Even though the exact costs of fulfilling 
the leasing contract have not been disclosed, it is estimated to be beyond 10% of the total annual 
defence budget. 
 
- 69 - 
[will] need to carry out [a] full rearmament of the HDF.”23 By 2014, the unsustain-
able situation regarding the financial and modernization gap had been acknowl-
edged at the top political level as well.24 Going beyond the 2012 government deci-
sion to maintain the nominal level of the Hungarian defence budget at the 2012 
level until 2016 and then to increase it by an annual 0.1% until 2022 (thus reaching 
1.39% of the GDP),25 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared at the 2014 Wales 
Summit that the increase in defence spending will be brought forward to 2015 in 
accordance with the growing demand on behalf of NATO. However, no specifici-
ties have been announced and the concrete measures to be undertaken will be  
decided by the Hungarian Parliament, most likely during the debate of the 2015 
fiscal budget in late 2014. 
Without elaborating upon the current defence capabilities and readiness of the 
Hungarian Defence Forces, it is indicative in this respect that the general level of 
technological modernization regarding major equipment is still at the level of the 
1970s-1980s (T-72 tanks, BTR-80A armoured personnel carriers, An-26 transport 
aircraft, Mi-8 transport helicopter etc.) or with modernizations the 1990s at best, 
with the exceptions of the JAS-39 Gripen multirole aircraft and some equipment 
provided for the land forces deployed in peace operations in Afghanistan and the 
Balkans. As Tamás Kern has pointed out, subsequent Hungarian governments 
have tended to design and launch “military reforms” and ‘modernization pro-
grammes’ in such a way that cost saving and cutback measures were achieved dur-
ing their election period while increased investment and procurement measures 
were always scheduled or postponed to the next or later election periods.26  
Unfortunately, incoming governments again tended to redesign or simply further 
postpone modernization, thus by 2013 the Hungarian Defence Forces came to the 
brink of their operational capability. Besides procrastinating on modernization, the 
alarming amount and sustained trend of cuts of the operation and maintenance 
budget within the Hungarian defence expenditure have caused considerable capa-
bility losses and a decrease in operational readiness. Even though the Hungarian 
Defence Forces has remained capable of fulfilling its duties and commitments 
within NATO crisis management operations, the general operability and spectrum 
 
 
23 Hende: Újrafegyverkezésre van szükség. “Világgazdaság Online”, 6 May 2013, [www.vg.hu, access:  
1 September 2014]. 
24 Interjú Orbán Viktorral a NATO csúcs után, “Hirado.hu”, 6 September 2014, [www.hirado.hu,  
access: 7 September 2014]. 
25 T. Csiki: Az új Nemzeti Katonai Stratégia a nemzetközi tapasztalatok tükrében. “Nemzet és Biztonság”, 
2014/2, p. 59. 
26 T. Kern, A rendszerváltás utáni haderőreform-kísérletek. Eredmények és kudarcok. Századvég Műhely-
tanulmányok 7. Századvég Alapítvány: Budapest 2009, p. 43. 
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of capabilities can be questioned in various fields and these shortcomings require 
urgent action. 
This type of conduct in defence planning and capability development has  
become a tendency in several NATO member countries that joined the alliance in 
1999 and in 2004 from the East Central European region and the Balkans, thus it 
is imperative to point out this “lesson unlearnt” for prospective members as well. 
The third set of lessons unlearnt is related to regional multinational defence 
cooperation (MDC), more precisely the lack of understanding of how to utilize the 
full benefits these can bring possibly without engaging in unnecessary pilot pro-
jects or developing less functional capability packages only for political gains, sacri-
ficing scarce resources without practical long-lasting effects. Hungary has in the 
past 15 years participated in various forms of multinational defence cooperation 
with varying practical results. However, these have mostly been developed outside 
NATO’s capability development framework or the NATO Defence Planning  
Process with the outstanding examples of two European Union Battle Groups27 
and other cooperative projects within the Central European Defence Cooperation 
(CEDC).28 
While following the broader international trend of developing ‘clusters of  
capabilities’ within regional frameworks (see the examples of the BENELUX and 
NORDEFCO co-operations, as well as the French - British bilateral cooperation), 
what we can see by the end of 2014 in Hungary is that the practical usability of 
some of the developed high-profile frameworks can hardly be judged. Either driv-
en by the lack of political will, the necessary financial resources or the lack of mili-
tary capabilities some of these have not fully been developed or if developed,  
never used (EU BGs for example.) On the one hand, it is positive that the high-
level political will to support and participate in such multinational defence  
co-operative efforts has been strengthening in Hungary as well, as these are often 
 
 
27 The first EU BG Hungary has become part of is the Italian-led Battle Group that had been  
developed on the basis of the Italian - Hungarian - Slovenian Multinational Land Force (operable 
since 2002) on standby in 2007 and in 2012 as the crisis management entry force of the European 
Union. The second Battle Group is to be developed with the participation of the Visegrád Coun-
tries by 2016, composed of Czech, Hungarian, Slovak and Polish troops, the latter taking the role 
of lead nation as well.  
28 Within the CEDC (formerly also known as the Roundtable on Central European Multinational 
Defence Cooperation, or Central European Defence Initiative), six Central European nations - 
Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia - began to intensify their 
defence cooperation in 2011 and various programmes have been implemented since then: a multi-
national CBRN defence battalion was established, joint Special Operations Forces training, C-IED 
training and Air Mentor Team training for Afghanistan have been initiated and a Multinational 
Logistic Coordination Centre was also established. T. Csiki, B. Németh, Perspectives of Central Europe-
an Multinational Defence Cooperation: A New Model?, [in:] Panorama of the Global Security Environment 
2013, Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs: Bratislava 2013, pp. 18-19. 
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seen as a possible solution to the identified capability shortages in Europe.29 While 
on the other hand, delivered results, real capability development that would go 
beyond the pooling of existing capabilities and generate new ones in missing fields 
through joint procurement and sharing mechanisms are currently missing. The 
only exception is a NATO-branded project also included among the role models 
of Smart Defence: Strategic Airlift Capability, where 17 nations procured and have 
been operating three C-17 Globemaster strategic transport aircraft from Pápa  
Airbase in Hungary. This signals a strong contrast in favour of well-functioning 
large capability development projects within NATO and smaller, practical cooper-
ative programmes within CEDC. While the use of developing another EU Battle 
Group that rather provides solutions to the capability needs of the 2000s30 and not 
the post-ISAF and post-Crimea security environment can be questioned, it also 
distracts resources from existing and functioning frameworks for the sake of har-
vesting the political gains within the Visegrád Group for developing a capability 
package that may never even be used as experience with EU Battle Groups has 
demonstrated so far.  
Thus, in sum, the significance of multinational defence co-operations has been 
realized, its short-term political yield has been harvested, yet the real value deliv-
ered in terms of usability can be questioned, for example, in the case of the current 
flagship project of the V4.31 For the coming years it would be of utmost im-
portance for Hungary to align the current parallel processes of MDCs with its lim-
ited financial resources available and to opt for operable, deployable capabilities 
also within the framework of NATO that are achievable in the mid-term and  







29 T. Csiki, B. Németh, On the Multinational Development of Military Capabilities, “European Geostrategy 
- Long Post”, 13 June 2012, [www.europeangeostrategy.ideasoneurope.eu, access: 7 September 
2014]. 
30 T. Csiki, B. Németh, Perspectives of…, pp. 20-21. 
31 We have seen other examples of this kind as well in the past: the Hungarian - Romanian Joint 
Peacekeeping Battalion was established in 1998 incorporating 500 troops from both parties, while 
the Multinational Engineer Battalion “Tisza” incorporating troops from Ukraine, Romania and 
Hungary, each providing a company for the battalion was established in 1998 and became opera-
tional in 2002. Despite various occasions when these units could have been used, none of them has 
ever been deployed - still, they are kept alive, for which building confidence, trust and enhancing 
interoperability can only be a partial explanation. B. Németh, Magyarország szerepe a regionális biz-
tonsági-védelmi együttműködésekben, [in:] Magyar biztonságpolitika, 1989 - 2014. Nemzeti Közszolgálati 
Egyetem, Nemzetközi Intézet, Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont: Budapest 2014, pp. 93-106. 
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Conclusions 
 
Several controversial characteristics of Hungary’s NATO membership as well 
as the broader Hungarian security and defence policy and Hungarian strategic cul-
ture have been examined throughout the chapter, resulting from the continuous, 
unbalanced and in certain areas unfinished transformation the country has experi-
enced in the past two decades. 
The direct effects of NATO membership can be identified in three areas: in 
the transformed Hungarian security and defence policy that can be traced in stra-
tegic documents; in terms of compatibility with NATO institutional structures and 
systems and interoperability with other NATO members’ armed forces; and the 
contribution of the Hungarian Defence Forces to the Alliance’s collective defence 
tasks and crisis management operations. Lessons learnt in these respects include 
learning the institutional culture of NATO and participating fully in decision mak-
ing, also ensuring the democratic control of the defence sector as well as effective-
ly contributing to Allied defence and operations through NATO structures. 
Regarding lessons unlearnt, there are three broad topics in which Hungary 
needs to learn from the experiences of the past 15 years: the underdeveloped secu-
rity culture of Hungarian society and the political elite that puts restraints on the 
defence sector, ranking security and defence policy as only one of many tasks and 
needs; the unfinished and fragmented attempts at ‘reform and modernization’  
leaving the Hungarian Defence Forces with mostly outdated military equipment 
even 15 years after accession; and lacks in the understanding of the true potential 
of multinational defence cooperation with some positive signs, and the need to 
prioritize and align efforts effectively in accordance with the country’s resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
